Conceding to much power and too much autonomy to the Haredim. They should have insisted on them bearing the burden of the struggle for survival by participating in the military. Israel should have not granted authority over marriage and conversion to a tiny minority of rabbis.
Christian Nationalism is a great threat in the USA. Candidates who espouse this theory want to make Christianity the State religion. To me an educated Jew this does not seem that different from the religious rights position in israel. In fact while historically we controlled Eretz Israel we treated the Ger Toshav well, so Kal v’ Chomer we should do even better for our fellow less observant Jews. There are enough tyrannical religious countries in the Middle East and Israel should not be one. Kiruv should be encouraged in a Jewish way not legislated by Rabbinical appointees
Not the greatest mistake but it keeps happening.After every missile or other attack from Gaza, Israel attacks a bomb factory, a tunnel, or some other area that threatens Israel. If you know where they are either after the next provocation take them all out, and if some pose an immediate danger, don't wait. The world will condemn Israel anyway, take care of your people.
Repatriating the PLO from Tunisia; not having geographically based voting regions; not responding immediately to attacks from Gaza; not responding (or planning responses) when PA/Lebanon/UNIFIL/EU fail to keep agreements.
I entirely agree with Ha'artez's Amos Harel (link below) that it was a strategic and moral mistake to not immediately and emphatically come down on the side of virtue - the right side of world history and our history - against Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Russia provides us with nothing, rather strengthens our bitterest enemies.
Russia also doesn't pose a realistic threat to us - not even to our "campaign between the wars".
Coming down on the moral side would also, importantly, be on the side of our truest ally.
In August 2006, Israel was forced into accepting UN Resolution 1701, ending the Second Lebanon War. Among other elements, the resolution explicitly prohibited the shipment of offensive weaponry into southern Lebanon. Yet, within a matter of weeks, Israeli intelligence began letting it be known that Iran was shipping rockets and rocket parts, among other weapons, by truck convoys into the supposedly demilitarized area.
Israel had the intelligence to act in Lebanon and could have begun picking off shipments akin to what it has been doing in Syria in recent years. Instead, leadership made the decision to not escalate because the amount of shipments weren't that great and because Israel had a handle on where it was. Israel also prided itself on sharing that intelligence with the Bush and then Obama administrations and the Europeans, who all praised Israel for its restraint. Plus, after the trauma of thee Second Lebanon War, Israel didn't want to risk an escalation that might lead to yet another major conflict.
Of course, that restraint/passivity became fixed national policy, even as the level and lethality of the weapons being shipped and stored grew from an annoying violation of Resolution 1701 into a strategic threat. And even if Israel continued to believe that it had the intelligence and firepower to take out those rocket sites and warehouses in a manageable conflict, the presence now of so many sophisticated rockets in southern Lebanon acts as a brake on Israel’s willingness to take on the larger Iranian threat.
Early and continuous action in support of enforcement of Resolution 1701 would have exacted costs on Hezbollah and Iran, and degraded their ability to use southern Lebanon as a literal launchpad for yet more regional mayhem directed at Israel.
I toured the west bank in July, 1967. In Jerusalem I ran into Nechamah Leibowitz with whom I had stiudied. She was convinced that the victory was evidence of mashiach. That attitude, dati or chiloni, blocked the opportunity for peace through establishing Palestine under friendly conditions. The war had not been against Palestinians but against Jordan, Egypt, and all the rest. The Palestinians could, in those days, have negotiated alliance. Hubris.
Recognizing that any insight benefiting from decades of hindsight has to be enveloped by a waterfall of humility, I'll offer this: returning every square centimeter of the Sinai was a strategic error, even while it was a tactical necessity. I'm not referring to the billions it cost to replace the Eitam and Etzion bases; or the loss of airfields, the civilian settlements and the naval base, or even the relinquishing of the sophisticated early warning stations. Those were the very steep price of trying to induce Israel's most dangerous national enemy to a treaty, which made and makes sense. Returning all those bases and the tens of thousands of square kilometers of desert can be seen as worth it; decades of even a cold peace is worth the price. Returning Yamit and even Taba however, set the precedent for other territorial disputes. After Mubarak stood fast on receiving every grain of sand, no Arab leader would ever be the first not to do the same, no matter the cost. If - again, hindsight! - Israel had retained even that 600-yard beachfront and the Sonesta Hotel in Taba, there would have been the possibility of very different negotiations in the North. Notwithstanding the logic, all this is a moot point anyway, given the nightmare on our Northern border, whether it's the failed state or the state that should have failed.
As a Jew in the diaspora it's quite easy to make this critique, but one big thing that I wish Israel could do better is Arabic proficiency among the Jewish population. Arabic is taught in Israeli schools, but we all know how little (if any) Arabic Jewish Israelis know by the time they finish Bagrut. Imagine how much Jewish-Arab relations would improve if Israeli Jews could speak Arabic — from basic things like some Israeli Jews feeling uncomfortable (justifiably or not) when they hear Arabic spoken on public transport, or interactions between IDF soldiers and Palestinians that turn unnecessarily tense due to language barriers. When I'm in Israel I try use my extremely limited Arabic when I interact with Arab-Israelis/Palestinians, and (I'm not trying to gloat here) you can see how much they appreciate it. I don't know whether this would ever change, but I really believe widespread Arabic proficiency among Israeli Jews would make the world of difference for Jewish and Arab Israelis and Palestinians — it's a real shame that speaking Arabic isn't widely seen as a desirable skill among Jewish Israelis
Israel should have frozen the Oslo process in its early stages, until the "Palestinian National Council" fulfilled Arafat's commitment on the White House lawn to formally amend the Palestinian National Charter. When Peres insisted on looking the other way, it set a precedent and signaled to the PLO that Israel could be bamboozled into unlimited concessions.
1. Not to celarly separate the State from the religions, and on the contrary fund them, particularly the haredim. This is extremely serious, could destroy the jewish people, and not only Israel.
2. Not invest huge money in public diplomacy, to "sell" the Israel image abroad.
1. Imprisoning and in some cases releasing terrorists and those who enable terrorists. Captured terrorists should never EVER be released. They should be exploited for intelligence purposes and then executed.
2. Letting those who attack Israel and are defeated survive to try again, thus teaching that attacking Israel in a risk-free endeavor. In particular, when Israel withdrew from Lebanon, it should have created an uninhabited and uninhabitable hellscape in its wake, with nothing but rubble, ashes, corpses, and landmines.
3. An at-large voting scheme for members of Knesset, which rewards the extortionate demands of minor parties.
Costliest mistake of Israeli governments has been allowing individual non-government actors to hijack government policy: domestic policy, foreign policy ... very seldom are monumental decisions subjected to any kind of dispassionate analysis or review: settlements, temple mount, reuniting Jerusalem in '67, Lebanon agreement in '82-'83 carried out by Interior Ministry and not the foreign ministry. Too much cowboy not enough statecraft. A history of policies beholden to exceedingly tiny cliques without regard to the whole of the electorate. Too many "fait accompli" ... when I worked in Israel a common phrase was to talk about 'making the company pregnant' with a particular project without regard to the overall direction, budget, etc. of the company. The good part is that one individual can have an impact; the back part is that one individual can have an impact.
Allowing Haredim to bypass the army (decision from the early 50s) has done both them and the State a grave injustice and profound problems.
Coddling the ultraOrthodox and allowing them to engage in hateful and violent behavior
Conceding to much power and too much autonomy to the Haredim. They should have insisted on them bearing the burden of the struggle for survival by participating in the military. Israel should have not granted authority over marriage and conversion to a tiny minority of rabbis.
Christian Nationalism is a great threat in the USA. Candidates who espouse this theory want to make Christianity the State religion. To me an educated Jew this does not seem that different from the religious rights position in israel. In fact while historically we controlled Eretz Israel we treated the Ger Toshav well, so Kal v’ Chomer we should do even better for our fellow less observant Jews. There are enough tyrannical religious countries in the Middle East and Israel should not be one. Kiruv should be encouraged in a Jewish way not legislated by Rabbinical appointees
Not the greatest mistake but it keeps happening.After every missile or other attack from Gaza, Israel attacks a bomb factory, a tunnel, or some other area that threatens Israel. If you know where they are either after the next provocation take them all out, and if some pose an immediate danger, don't wait. The world will condemn Israel anyway, take care of your people.
Repatriating the PLO from Tunisia; not having geographically based voting regions; not responding immediately to attacks from Gaza; not responding (or planning responses) when PA/Lebanon/UNIFIL/EU fail to keep agreements.
I entirely agree with Ha'artez's Amos Harel (link below) that it was a strategic and moral mistake to not immediately and emphatically come down on the side of virtue - the right side of world history and our history - against Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Russia provides us with nothing, rather strengthens our bitterest enemies.
Russia also doesn't pose a realistic threat to us - not even to our "campaign between the wars".
Coming down on the moral side would also, importantly, be on the side of our truest ally.
Here's the link:
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-07-26/ty-article/.premium/jewish-agency-crisis-is-israels-opportunity-to-take-a-moral-stance-on-ukraine/00000182-3b90-d9f7-a9e6-fbb3f9880000
In August 2006, Israel was forced into accepting UN Resolution 1701, ending the Second Lebanon War. Among other elements, the resolution explicitly prohibited the shipment of offensive weaponry into southern Lebanon. Yet, within a matter of weeks, Israeli intelligence began letting it be known that Iran was shipping rockets and rocket parts, among other weapons, by truck convoys into the supposedly demilitarized area.
Israel had the intelligence to act in Lebanon and could have begun picking off shipments akin to what it has been doing in Syria in recent years. Instead, leadership made the decision to not escalate because the amount of shipments weren't that great and because Israel had a handle on where it was. Israel also prided itself on sharing that intelligence with the Bush and then Obama administrations and the Europeans, who all praised Israel for its restraint. Plus, after the trauma of thee Second Lebanon War, Israel didn't want to risk an escalation that might lead to yet another major conflict.
Of course, that restraint/passivity became fixed national policy, even as the level and lethality of the weapons being shipped and stored grew from an annoying violation of Resolution 1701 into a strategic threat. And even if Israel continued to believe that it had the intelligence and firepower to take out those rocket sites and warehouses in a manageable conflict, the presence now of so many sophisticated rockets in southern Lebanon acts as a brake on Israel’s willingness to take on the larger Iranian threat.
Early and continuous action in support of enforcement of Resolution 1701 would have exacted costs on Hezbollah and Iran, and degraded their ability to use southern Lebanon as a literal launchpad for yet more regional mayhem directed at Israel.
I toured the west bank in July, 1967. In Jerusalem I ran into Nechamah Leibowitz with whom I had stiudied. She was convinced that the victory was evidence of mashiach. That attitude, dati or chiloni, blocked the opportunity for peace through establishing Palestine under friendly conditions. The war had not been against Palestinians but against Jordan, Egypt, and all the rest. The Palestinians could, in those days, have negotiated alliance. Hubris.
Recognizing that any insight benefiting from decades of hindsight has to be enveloped by a waterfall of humility, I'll offer this: returning every square centimeter of the Sinai was a strategic error, even while it was a tactical necessity. I'm not referring to the billions it cost to replace the Eitam and Etzion bases; or the loss of airfields, the civilian settlements and the naval base, or even the relinquishing of the sophisticated early warning stations. Those were the very steep price of trying to induce Israel's most dangerous national enemy to a treaty, which made and makes sense. Returning all those bases and the tens of thousands of square kilometers of desert can be seen as worth it; decades of even a cold peace is worth the price. Returning Yamit and even Taba however, set the precedent for other territorial disputes. After Mubarak stood fast on receiving every grain of sand, no Arab leader would ever be the first not to do the same, no matter the cost. If - again, hindsight! - Israel had retained even that 600-yard beachfront and the Sonesta Hotel in Taba, there would have been the possibility of very different negotiations in the North. Notwithstanding the logic, all this is a moot point anyway, given the nightmare on our Northern border, whether it's the failed state or the state that should have failed.
As a Jew in the diaspora it's quite easy to make this critique, but one big thing that I wish Israel could do better is Arabic proficiency among the Jewish population. Arabic is taught in Israeli schools, but we all know how little (if any) Arabic Jewish Israelis know by the time they finish Bagrut. Imagine how much Jewish-Arab relations would improve if Israeli Jews could speak Arabic — from basic things like some Israeli Jews feeling uncomfortable (justifiably or not) when they hear Arabic spoken on public transport, or interactions between IDF soldiers and Palestinians that turn unnecessarily tense due to language barriers. When I'm in Israel I try use my extremely limited Arabic when I interact with Arab-Israelis/Palestinians, and (I'm not trying to gloat here) you can see how much they appreciate it. I don't know whether this would ever change, but I really believe widespread Arabic proficiency among Israeli Jews would make the world of difference for Jewish and Arab Israelis and Palestinians — it's a real shame that speaking Arabic isn't widely seen as a desirable skill among Jewish Israelis
Israel should have frozen the Oslo process in its early stages, until the "Palestinian National Council" fulfilled Arafat's commitment on the White House lawn to formally amend the Palestinian National Charter. When Peres insisted on looking the other way, it set a precedent and signaled to the PLO that Israel could be bamboozled into unlimited concessions.
1. Not to celarly separate the State from the religions, and on the contrary fund them, particularly the haredim. This is extremely serious, could destroy the jewish people, and not only Israel.
2. Not invest huge money in public diplomacy, to "sell" the Israel image abroad.
Mistakes:
1. Imprisoning and in some cases releasing terrorists and those who enable terrorists. Captured terrorists should never EVER be released. They should be exploited for intelligence purposes and then executed.
2. Letting those who attack Israel and are defeated survive to try again, thus teaching that attacking Israel in a risk-free endeavor. In particular, when Israel withdrew from Lebanon, it should have created an uninhabited and uninhabitable hellscape in its wake, with nothing but rubble, ashes, corpses, and landmines.
3. An at-large voting scheme for members of Knesset, which rewards the extortionate demands of minor parties.
Shamir's unwillingness to even look at the London accords before torpedoing them.
Ben Gurion's policy regarding Haredi Jews, basically allowing them to live on handouts.
There are many other mistakes most have been already stated
Costliest mistake of Israeli governments has been allowing individual non-government actors to hijack government policy: domestic policy, foreign policy ... very seldom are monumental decisions subjected to any kind of dispassionate analysis or review: settlements, temple mount, reuniting Jerusalem in '67, Lebanon agreement in '82-'83 carried out by Interior Ministry and not the foreign ministry. Too much cowboy not enough statecraft. A history of policies beholden to exceedingly tiny cliques without regard to the whole of the electorate. Too many "fait accompli" ... when I worked in Israel a common phrase was to talk about 'making the company pregnant' with a particular project without regard to the overall direction, budget, etc. of the company. The good part is that one individual can have an impact; the back part is that one individual can have an impact.